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Introduction
In a period in which an event as interesting and important as the formulation of Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure by the
American Law Institute and the International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law (UNIDROIT) is sternly advancing to accommodate basic
procedural concepts for both the civil and common law systems, a central
problem faced in such conciliation seems to be that of clarifying the actual
roles and responsibilities of judges and lawyers in the conduct of a civil
dispute.' To do so will essentially mean scrutinizing the value and validity
of settled conceptions of the inherent features of civil and common law
systems, including the notion that these systems are basically opposite each
other. 2 In other words, we will attempt to evaluate the correctness and
t Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., is the Thomas E. Miller Distinguished Professor of Law
at the University of California Hastings College of the Law.
t Angelo Dondi is a Professor of Civil Procedure at the University of Genoa, Italy.
The authors wish to thank Dr. Vincenzo Ansanelli for the precious help provided editing
and reshaping of the footnotes.
1. See, e.g., A.L.I./UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE, DISCUSSION DRAFT No. 4 (2003); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Transnational
Rules of Civil Procedure: a Challenge to Judge and Lawyers, 51 STUDI URBINATI DI SCIENZE
GIURIDICHE, POLITICHE, ED ECONOMICHE 247 (1999).
2. See, e.g., Michele Taruffo, Il processo civile di "civil law" e di "common law": aspetti

fondamentali, in 126 IL FORO ITALiANO 345 (2001).
39 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 59 (2006)
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reliability of this assertion, as well as to the unavoidable opposition it
incurs.
Focusing on the respective roles of lawyers and judges is especially
convenient in conceiving a different configuration of the relationship
between civil and common law systems, and reaching a more appropriate
(though maybe less reassuring and simple) vision of the reality. The traditional view of the fundamental difference between the so-called "civil" and
"common" law systems in the allegedly crucial different responsibilities of
the judge, on the one hand, and of the advocates for the parties, on the
3
other, makes such an approach necessary.
One question to be considered-the first part of our discussion
below-is why the analysis of these responsibilities is conceived as a "natural" pathway for understanding both the characteristics of the two systems
and their mutual relationship represented in itself.
The second part of the discussion will provide a closer inspection of
the nature of these responsibilities, including their functional details.
What too often happens, in our opinion, is that these roles are referred to
in general terms, rather than focusing on their functionality, with the result
of either exaggerating the differences between the systems or disregarding
important similarities.
The third topic considered will be the widespread trend of procedural
systems toward reducing their mutual differences. We would tend to identify-roughly speaking-commercial disputes as the area in which this phenomenon is most commonly observed. This kind of lawsuit typically takes
place between experienced businesspersons who engage in litigation concerning only serious and substantial disputes and who have the resources
to employ competent advocates. 4 Other categories of legal disputes, such
as family law litigation, employment disputes, or environmental regulation
controversies, present different problems. On the other hand, all legal systems ought to recognize the possibility that procedural rules may be
adapted differently to various kinds of legal disputes. With this in mind, it
is important to note that we refer specifically to the tendency towards convergence of procedural rules in commercial disputes.
I.

Roles of the Advocate and Judge: Traditional Comparative
Discourse

As mentioned above, the traditional differentiation between the civil
and common law systems is the difference in the responsibilities of judges
3. See, e.g., Rolf Sturner, Some European Remarks on a New JointProject of the American Law Institute and UNIDROIT, 34 INT'L LAw. 1071 (2000) (discussing the present

state of transnational civil procedure, including the "fundamental difference" of the
roles of lawyers and judges in civil and common law systems).
4. Cf. Richard L. Marcus, Malaise of the Litigation Superpower, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN
CRISIS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

71, 92 passim (Adrian A.S. Zucker-

man ed., 1999) [hereinafter ZUCKERMAN] (discussing the rising costs of litigation in
American courts, which potentially inhibits pursuing claims involving insubstantial
matters).
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and lawyers. This differentiation is basically founded on the assumption
that, in civil law systems, civil cases are actually directed by the judge, with
subordinate participation by the parties' advocates. 5 An illustration of this
conception of the judge's role is that traditionally it was thought to be up to
him to determine the matters in dispute, identify the necessary evidence,
schedule the necessary intermediate and final hearings, and eventually formulate the judgment according to the law and the proof. 6 In such a system,
the lawyers' activities may be characterized as residual. They may make
suggestions concerning the evidence, as well as propose either issues to be
examined or questions to be asked at the hearings, or eventually submit
comments concerning the legal basis of the dispute. 7 In a metaphorical
comparison, the judge is conceived as the priest, while the advocates act as
the acolytes-deferential assistants in a ceremony controlled thoroughly by
the judge.
A similar and grossly simplistic conception of the common law judge
is that of a passive moderator between presentations organized and
directed by rival advocates. The fundamental responsibility for identifying
the legal contentions to be considered, the evidence to be considered, and
the ultimate basis of judgment remains with the advocates. 8 Furthermore,
the presence of the jury to determine facts-as in the United States system
of litigation-renders the judge even more passive. 9 The jury is bound to
decide the facts on the basis of legal instructions that, while given by the
judge, are initially proposed by the advocates.
Accordingly, advocates in common law litigation are referred to as
"combatants," such as those participating in a tennis or wrestling match,
while the judge acts as an umpire in the traditional metaphor. 10 What
seems easy to perceive from these conceptions is that the differences
5. See

GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. &

ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS:

A

COMPARATIVE

STUDY 63-108 (2004).

6. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L.
823, 835-45 (1985) (discussing the traditional conception of the German civil procedure system, an oft-used example of a civil law system); John H. Langbein, Trashing the
REV.

German Advantage, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 763 (1988) (same).
7. See, e.g., Erhard Blankenburg & Ulrike Schultz, German Advocates: A Highly Regulated Profession, in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD 124, 133, 135-36
(Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988) (discussing the distribution of responsibilities between judges and advocates in Germany); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Some
ComparativeReflections on First Instance Civil Procedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil
Procedureand the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 609, 609 (1988).
8. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 11, 25, 75 (1980); Arthur R. Miller, The
Adversary System: Dinosauror Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1984).
9. Cf. Sanja Kutnjak lvkovit & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors' Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 441 (2003) (demonstrating the further weakening of the judge's role in the jury system with regards to
expert testimony); Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133,
136-47 (1997) (discussing some commentary from federal judges on the proposed
expansion of federal civil juries to twelve members).
10.

See Au.AN

C. HUTCHINSON,

IT'S ALL IN THE GAME: A NONFOUNDATIONALIST

ACCOUNT OF LAW AND ADJUDICATION 288-319 (2000); see generally Wayne D. Brazil, The
Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L.
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between the two allegedly most important law systems are stressed, and
that, in this perspective, these differences seem substantial and, as such,
virtually unbridgeable. In other words, the basic assumption is that the
systems can be defined only by way of contrast, rather than by way of similarities. This assumption is in fact commonplace in the traditional comparative study of law, especially procedure, and is still perpetuated
nowadays.1 1
II.

Roles of the Advocate and Judge: A Functional Analysis

It must be said, however, that in commercial litigation, this traditional
contrast seems at least misleading, especially considering that the parties
are generally sophisticated in business affairs, have real disputes about
substantial and material matters, and tend to employ experienced advocates to represent them. Of course, the problems of procedure and justice
in other areas, such as family law litigation, in which the parties may be of
unequal competence, the disputes arise out of personal relationships, or
one or both parties lack competent counsel, are different.
A.

Advocates

In both civil and common law systems, the advocates in modern commercial litigation have a primary role in defining the disputes, as well as
the legal and factual bases under which they are adjudicated. However, in
both common law and civil law systems, the judge maintains a pivotal role
in managing the development of the case and the sequence of addressing
and resolving issues, as well as a general managerial role in setting each
single hearing. Regardless, the best metaphor for the roles of judge and
advocates in modern commercial litigation in both civil and common law
systems is that of a committee in which there are representatives for each
different interest (the advocates) and a chairperson (the judge) responsible
for the orderly exploration and resolution of the controversy. Further, in
modern litigation, there are often more than two parties involved-at times
several parties-and consequently the resolution frequently becomes a
combination of adjudication, mediation and negotiation. Thus, some typical elements of the advocate's role in modern commercial litigation must
further be considered.
1.

Selection of the Forum

In this context, the initiative is clearly with the parties. Usually, the
injured party selects the forum, barring an enforceable forum selection
clause in the contract between the parties. As all realistic analysts of civil
REV. 1295 (1978) (providing a classic account of some of the problems with an adversarial system during discovery).
11. See, e.g., David S. Clark, Comparing the Work and Organizationof Lawyers Worldwide: The Persistence of Legal Traditions, in LAWYERS' PRACTICE & IDEALS: A COMPARATIVE
VIEw 9, 35-69 (JohnJ. Barcel6 IlI & Roger C. Cramton eds., 1999) (outlining the differences in the roles of lawyers worldwide).
HeinOnline -- 39 Cornell Int'l L.J. 62 2006
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procedural realize, this choice is fraught with consequences and affects the
resolution of a legal controversy. However, the judge takes no part in the
initial choice of forum, despite its importance to the ultimate resolution of
the dispute. Traditionally, the judge has only the negative authority to
refuse jurisdiction whenever the initiating party has chosen an improper or
inappropriate forum.
2.

Formulation of Claims and Defenses

A rule generally found in most legal systems is that the advocate for
the plaintiff formulates the claims to be considered, while the respondent's
counsel bears a corresponding responsibility to formulate the defenses and
counterclaims, if applicable. These tasks must be accomplished in the context of the pleadings or, as in the American system, in the pretrial order that
follows the pleadings. Similar chances to formulate or change the claims or
defenses after the pleadings exist also in some European systems, for
instance the Italian legal system. In the Italian system, the defendant's
advocate can actually delay the formulation of the response well after the
initial phase, triggering either mutual options to respond on the side of his
opponent lawyer for the plaintiff, and a virtually endless postponement of
12
the actual framing of the case in view of its definition by the judge.
On the other hand, the parties' advocates have almost as much room
for this kind of strategic choices in most of the other European legal systems, although with a lesser scope of inherent powers on the side of lawyers. This is also the case in France, and to an even greater degree in
Germany. The provisions on this subject in the French Nouveau Code de
Procedure Civile provide the advocate-within the boundaries of basicfondement serieux of each pleading or request1 3 -with an extremely wide range
of strategic choices and professional undertakings. The lawyer's role is of
fundamental value in the stages of mise en oeuvre de l'action and deroulement de l'instance, although the lawyer acts with constant judicial supervision aimed at fully carrying out principles "de la contradiction"and "de la
cooperation" between the parties' advocates. 14 Likewise, the German ZPO
(the German code of civil procedure) grants the lawyer a similar range of
options through the written complaint (the Klage), which controls the "procedural initiative" in order to properly shape the complaint at the outset of
12. Cf. Angelo Dondi, Abuse of ProceduralRights: Regional Report for Italy and France,
in ABUSE OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 109,
109-12 (Michele Taruffo ed., 1998) (discussing the lack of a defined concept of "abuse
of procedural rights" in Italian civil procedure).
13. See SERGE GUINCHARD ET AL., DROIT PROCESSUEL: DROIT COMMUN DU PROCES 520
(2001) (discussing the recent shuffle in French civil procedure rules); see also Melina
Douchy, Le decret n. 98-1231 du decembre 1998 modifiant le code de l'organisation
judiciare et le nouveau code de procedure civile: l'adoption partielle des propositions du rapport de J.-M. Coulon, reprinted in 2001 GAZETTE DU PALAIS [GAz. PAL.], Doctrine II 831

(1999).
14. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] arts. 1-8, 16, 53-59 (96th ed.
Dalloz 2004) (Fr.); see also DROIT JUDICIAIRE PRIVE 376 (4th ed. Cadiet & Jeuland eds.,
2004); PROCEDURE CIVILE 437 (Cornu & Foyer eds., 1996).
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the litigation though the judge, called the Hinweispflicht.15
In a different cultural context, the recent Spanish procedural reform
embodied in the so-called "LEC 2000" or "LEY 1/2000" adopted a similar
interaction between the advocates and judicial power in the initial stage of
a civil litigation. The great number of chances to frame pleadings by the
lawyers of each party is fully balanced-as provided by the Articulo 401 of
the new LEY-against the very strong powers of the judge, whose control is
aimed at avoiding abusive strategies by the advocate in the very beginning
6
of a civil case.1
B. Judges
In both civil and common law systems, the courts have authority to
permit amendments to the initial pleadings. Despite this trend, it remains
the exception in civil law procedure, where the general philosophy still
favors limiting the occasions for the judge to intervene and allow amendments. 17 Though such an authority is by no means more frequent in the
common law procedure, it is structurally more liberal in this respect. The
much broader power to frame the case conferred to the parties must be
considered, as it allows them to intellectually shape the basis of a legal
controversy. is Hence, in practice most common law judges do not interfere with parties' formulation of the issues, particularly where experienced
advocates are involved. 19 However, the fact seems to be that in all legal
systems the advocates actually frame the legal basis of a case. The ability to
15.

See PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF

STURNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE

12-13, 166 (2004);

Peter Gottwald, CiviliJustice Reform: Access, Cost, and Expedition. The German Perspective,
in ZUCKERMAN, supra note 4, at 207 passim.
16.

See JUAN MONTERO AROCA ET AL.,

EL NUEVO PROCESO CIVIL - LEY 1/2000, at

246-47, 445 (2000); Juan Damidn Moreno, Titulo II: Del Juicio Ordinario, in 2
COMENTARLOS A LA NUEVA LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVIL 2081-2193 (Antonio Maria Lorca

Navarrete ed., 2000); Joan Pic6 i Junoy, I principi del nuovo processo civile spagnolo, 2003
RISTA Di DRITro PROCESSUALE [RIv. DIR. PROC.] 65 (It.). But seeJuan Montero Aroca, II
processo civile "sociale" come strumento di giustizia autoritaria,2004 Riv. DIR. PROC. 553
(taking a critical approach to the new rules).
17. See, e.g., MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 15, at 237-39 (stating that the German
ZPO "represents a legislative narrowing of [the] traditional liberality" of allowing late
submissions of factual or legal materials and that "new claims, for relief . . . which
change the subject matter of the proceedings . . . may be added only under limited
conditions").
18. For some fairly recent discussions of the problem, see Edward Cavanagh, Pleading Rules in Antitrust Cases: A Return to Fact Pleading?,22 REV. LITIG. 1 (2002); Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading,81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002); Jeffrey A. Parness et
al., The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleadings Laws, 78 NEB. L. REV. 412

(1999).
19. See A.L.I.-A.B.A., LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN COMPLEX CIVIL LITIGATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER'S NEW MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 108 (2003);

Barbara Comninos Kruzansky, Note, Sanctions for Nonfrivolous Complaints? Sussman v.
Bank of Israel and Implicationsfor the Improper Purpose Prong of Rule 11, 61 ALB. L. REV.
1359 (1998); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice,76 TEX. L.
REv. 1749 (1998); see also PATRICK M. GARRY, A NATION OF ADVERSARIES: How THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION IS RESHAPING AMERICA 139 (1997); WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: How THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE THREATENS AMERICA'S RULE OF LAW 73 (2003);

Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, Honoring David Shapiro: The Integration of Law
HeinOnline -- 39 Cornell Int'l L.J. 64 2006
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frame the legal basis of a case has some consequences of fundamental
importance, particularly that the formulation of the legal basis of the case
determines what evidence can be relevant. In other words, the relevance of
evidence is derived from the issues to be determined, and again those
issues are more or less directly derived from the contentions formulated by
the advocates. 20 And in both civil law and common law systems it is
within these boundaries, initially established by the advocates for the parties, that the authority of the judge is exercised. Returning to the abovementioned metaphor of the priest, it might be true that the priest-like judge
gives the sermon, but the believer-like lawyers have already determined
from which part of the Bible the lesson for the day will be taken.
1.

Identification of Evidence

Broadly speaking, the conventional understanding of relevant evidence
is as follows: The issues determine the relevance, while the law determines
the issues. The formal correctness of this contention is not in question
here. However, what we would like to focus on is the actual process
through which this relevance determination takes place, and especially by
whom it may be initiated. In practice, without exception, the sequence of
analysis building up this determination begins with the advocates, particularly the claimant's advocate. 2 1 Commencement of civil litigation implies a
basic "feasibility evaluation" by the plaintiffs lawyer has occurred; the
advocate will not commence litigation unless he believes there is a legally
arguable case. 22 In determining whether there is a legally arguable case, an
advocate will have to make a preliminary determination as to whether there
is evidence to support the claim. Therefore, he will have provisionally
determined that there is relevant evidence prior to the case being
23
commenced.
and Fact in an Unchartered Parallel Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981,
2016 (2004).
20. See sources cited supra note 16; see also Shelly Brinker, Comment, Opening the
Door to the Indeterminate Plaintiff.An Analysis of the Causation Barriers Facing Environmental Toxic Tort Plaintiffs, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1289 (1999); Patricia J. Meyer, Note, What
Congress Said About the Heightened PleadingStandard:A Proposed Solution to the Securities
Fraud Pleading Confusion, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2517 (1998).
21. See FLEMING JAMES ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 215 (5th ed. 2001); see also Ann
Morales Olazabal, The Search for "Middle Ground": Towards a Harmonized Interpretation
of the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act's New PleadingStandard, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. &
FIN. 153 (2001); Parness et al., supra note 18, at 412.
22. See, e.g., FED. R. Ciw. P. 11 (providing for sanctions against attorneys whose filings to the court are not "warranted by existing law," do not present a valid argument for
modification of existing law, or contain facts which lack an evidentiary basis); THE
REFORMS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
ENCE DEDICATED

TO MAURO

IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERCAPPELLETTI,

FLORENCE,

12-13

DECEMBER,

2003 passim

(Nicol6 Trocker & Vicenzo Varano eds., 2005).
23. These features are considered in the Italian model of civil litigation in

MICHELE

(1992); Michele Taruffo, Funzione della prova: la funzione dimostrativa, 1997 RIVIsTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO E
PROCEDURA CIVILE [RIv. TRIM. DIR. PROC. CIv.] 558; see also LUIGI LOMBARDO, LA PROVA
GIUDIZIALE: CONTRIBUTO ALLA TEORIA DEL GIUDIZIO DI FATTO NEL PROCESSO (2000).
TARUFFO, LA PROVA DEI FATTI GIURIDICI: NOZIONI GENERALI
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In other words, from a functional perspective, the initial task of determining what relevant evidence exists is a task for the lawyer, not the judge.
Further, though the judge determines the relevant evidence on the basis of
the pleadings as they appear to him after the case is filed, it is the advocate
who initially determines the pleadings based on what he considers the rele24
vant evidence to be, as it appears to him before the case is even filed.
This pattern is widespread and commonly accepted as unquestionable in
25
all legal systems-both civil and common law families.
Of course, the judge retains a nevertheless fundamental role in the
above-mentioned sequence of analysis, which shapes the core of a legal
lawsuit, framing it for a decision. First of all, and somewhat unavoidably,
it is up to the judge to arrange an orderly sequence for receiving the evidence. 2 6 In doing so, the judge must necessarily give thought to the issues
involved in the case before him and provide direction for their resolution.
Stated differently, the judge must give the case further intellectual treatment, after the initial treatment performed by the advocate before the case
is filed.

27

Generally, the judge framing the case in such a contest will first check
the initial writings produced by the advocates on behalf of their clients. 28
The range and quality of these initial controls have a great impact on
whether a procedural system is efficient and effectively aimed at just
results. To reach these goals of justice and efficiency, the judge should not
limit his task to checking the formal package of the claim, though that is
certainly an essential and unavoidable part of the process. 29 However, he
should also plunge into the very intellectual and strategic foundation of
24. On this problem, see HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 5, at 63; T.P. Gallanis, The
Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IowA L. REV. 499 (1999) (suggesting that both lawyers'
power over evidence and the exclusionary approach to evidence derived from criminal
trials and spread gradually to civil trials); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 631 (1994); cf. MIRJAN R. DmASKA,
EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 74-124 (1997) (discussing the individual party's control over
determinations of factual parameters in common law litigations).
25. For an Italian perspective, see Taruffo, supra note 2. Some further treatment of
this topic can be

found

in HOWARD ABADINSKY, LAW AND JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO

292 passim (1995).
26. See Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,supra note 6, at 826-33.
27. For an overview of the evolution of discovery in the United States, see generally

THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM

EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED

&

THEODORE BLUMOFF, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY: STRATEGY AND TAC-

120 (Rev. ed. 1999); THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL 339 (4th ed. 1999); Kevin Brady,
PretrialScheduling and Management, in FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (Robert
Cindrich ed., 1996); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L.
REv. 1665 (1998); Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking Responses
to E-Discovery, 73 FoRDHiM L. REV. 1 (2004); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions
Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV.
691 (1998); Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective:Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL
L. REV. 299 (2002).
28. See Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,supra note 6, at 827-29.
29. See JAMES ROBERT FORCIER, JUDICIAL EXCESS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 91-93 (1994); Wayne D. Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the
Pretrial Development of Civil Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions,
1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 875, 890-915 (1981); Resnik, supra note 9, at 158-65; cf.
ROBERT J. NIEMIC ET AL., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR 11-13 (2001)
TICS
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these contentions. 30
In order to move the case toward a just resolution, the judge ought to
focus his attention on reaching the core of its conflict. This often involves
ridding the case of many of the useless complexities raised in the initial
writings of the advocates for tactical reasons, and figuring out a precise
and determined path towards resolution. 3 ' To do this, the judge must have
effective and formalized management power and a full understanding of
his duties. However, directing the process in this manner implies a vital
measure of judicial activism, which is functionally required and institution32
ally sanctioned in all procedural systems, whether civil or common law.
The 1999 English "Civil Procedure Rules" were recently reformed to
create a greater managerial role for judges. 33 The reform was grounded on
the philosophy that wide case management power should be granted to the
judge, especially in the preliminary stage of a civil proceeding. 34 In this
respect, the result of the English reform seems in many ways laudable and
almost amazing for most of the goals itattains. The cornerstone of this
reform is that the judge is now able to evaluate the probable complexity of
a case when it is initiated, in order to set it in the most appropriate of the
three planned procedural tracks, or to determine an ad hoc procedural
35
framework.
What seems even more noteworthy here is the very nature and range
of these organizational powers. These powers are not at all static, and provide a far-reaching range of intervention; they actually outline the practical
36
essence of the traditional notion of managerial judges.
In its modern English version, the notion of the managerial judge
might be seen as consisting of various judicial powers, distributed through
practically each successive articulation of a civil lawsuit; they are not limited to the commencement of action stage. Provisions such as those conferring upon the judge the "ultimate responsibility for the control of
(discussing the judge's considerations in determining whether to use alternative dispute

resolution).
30. See generally Hazard, supra note 27 (comparing the discovery system in the
United States with that in other countries). For a European perspective, see 1 ANGELO
DONDI, INTRODUZIONE DELLA CAUSA E STRATEGIE DI DIFESA (1991) (discussing the United
States), and more recently Angelo Dondi, Questioni di efficienza della fase preparatoria
nel processo civile statunitense (e prospettive italiane di riforma), 2003 Riv. TRIM. DIR.
PROC. CIv. 161.
31. See NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE: FUNDAMENTALS OF THE NEW CIVIL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 36-37 (2003); AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 35 (James S. Kakalik et al. eds., 1996); JusT, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM

12-21 Games S. Kakalik et al. eds., 1996); Paul Michalik, Justice in Crisis: England
and Wales, in ZUCKERMAN, supra note 4, at 117, 128; Dondi, supra note 30, at 161.
32. See ANDREWS, supra note 31, at 41-45, 60, 69.
33. See id. at 36, 38, 41-45, 68-71.
34. See id. at 41-45, 60, 69.
35. Id. at 337-42; JOHN O'HARE & KEVIN BROWNE, CIVIL LITIGATION 257, 377-84
(10th ed. 2001); Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, supra note 27, at
305.
36. See ANDREWS, supra note 31, at 41-45, 60, 69.
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litigation," in Lord Woolfs words, in fact permeate the later stages of litigation in the new English rules. For instance, those rules concerning the socalled disclosure or the selection of evidence demonstrate this responsibility. 3 7 In both these stages, the English judge has been empowered with
tools in order to dispose of the case, curtailing the ability of the advocates
for the parties to perform any sort of procedural abuse. 38
Such an active approach to case management, clearly designed to
encourage a hands-on approach by judges, gives at least a hint of the revolutionary trend by now pervading the philosophy of civil proceedings in
the common law systems. This philosophy seems somewhat unexpected
given the similarity to the paradigm of the "judge-centered" civil law systems-often considered completely incongruous.
III.

Convergence of Modern Procedural Systems

In the context of the managerial role of the judge in civil litigation, a
noteworthy convergence of the two systems has taken place. This convergence is, of course, more noticeable in some areas of the civil practice, such
as that of the modern commercial disputes.
These disputes most often involve complicated issues that involve multiple and interdependent questions of law and fact. 39 Further, they tend to
involve highly technical issues, sometimes of physical or medical science,
finance, or business or professional judgment that may require the use of
expert testimony, such as scientific tests, accounting analyses, or problems
40
of foreign law and language.
When issues of this kind are involved, the advocates have an inevitable
advantage over the judges at the outset of the litigation. This, of course, is
not because they are more intelligent or better informed in such matters
than the judges, but rather because in these circumstances clients seek out
37. See, e.g., Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, supra note 27, at
305.
38. For a European perspective, see generally Angelo Dondi, Complessita e adeguatezza nella riforma del processo societario - Spunti minimi di raffronto comparato, 2004
RIv. TRIM. DIR. PROC. CIV. 137. For the American view, see generally RICHARD L. MARCUS
& EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL
PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1992) (explaining the role of judges in federal proceedings); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life After Amchem: The Class Struggle Continues, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
373 (1998) (noting the role of judges in class action cases); Linda S. Mullenix, Practical
Wisdom and Third-GenerationMass Tort Litigation, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 551 (1998) (discussing the role of judges in mass tort litigation).
39. See Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 787-90 (1994). See generally JOANNA PAGE,
JOANNA DAY & LOUISE LE GAT, EXPERT EVIDENCE UNDER THE CPR: A COMPENDIUM OF CASES
FROM APRIL 1999 TO APRIL 2001 (2001); DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (2d ed. 2002); H.H. Kaufman, The
Expert Witness. Neither Frye nor Daubert Solved the Problem: What Can be Done?, 41 ScI.
& JUST. 7 (2001).
40. See JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANSGRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 1170 (1998). See generally MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 38 (federal
courts); Cabraser, supra note 38 (class actions); Mullenix, supra note 38 (mass tort). For
a European perspective, see Dondi, supra note 38.
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advocates who are especially adept in handling cases involving such complexities. In any event, when the underlying dispute is complicated, the
judges will necessarily be more dependent on the advocates than when the
court is dealing with a familiar and routine type of dispute.
More and more, commercial litigation tends to involve complexities of
the kind mentioned above. Routine disputes may more readily be settled,
so modern commercial litigation plays a greater part in shaping the role of
the advocates because they have more interaction with the judges, whatever
the legal system in which these disputes are adjudicated. Thus, the very
subject matter with which modern procedural systems must most frequently contend seems to influence the way in which the professional participants function.
Since every procedural system faces similar problems when dealing
with modern commercial litigation, the convergence of the procedures
between common law and civil law systems has become an unquestionable
and steady reality. Consequently, the actual conduct of litigation in modern systems looks more and more similar, whatever the tradition from
which they derive. In fact, these cases require active and creative initiatives
by the advocates, as well
as active, attentive, and flexible engagement on
41
the part of the judges.
Of course this does not mean that the differences between the systems
are fully erased. Though the general trend shows the systems are growing
together, there are still areas in which civil and common law procedures
continue to diverge. A noteworthy example is represented by a recent Italian procedural reform enacted in January 2004, concerning the alternative
42
dispute resolution in the adjudication of commercial cases.
Surprisingly enough, the whole philosophy of the new Italian rules is
founded on an ideal of a sharp restriction of the judicial powers, in view of
bringing them back to their allegedly original and inner feature of "sheer
decisional function. '43 In order to attain this goal, the judge's role has
been restricted to a mere late appearance past the stages of such importance as the commencement of the action and the pretrial process (with all
the possible discovery activities included). The judge is involved only at
the trial hearing; the remaining function left to the judge is conceived as
limited to adjudicating the case, while the preparation of the factual and
legal terms of adjudication are exclusively performed by the lawyers of the
44
parties.
With no hint of earlier judicial intervention in the proceeding whatsoever, the model conceived by the Italian legislators seems more apt to revi41. See Dondi, supra note 38, at 138; Romano Vaccarella, La riforma del processo
societario: risposta ad un editoriale, in 2 CORRIERE GluRIDICO [CORR. GUIR.] 262 (2003).
42. For a discussion of this reform, see Cecilia Carrara, Critical Analysis of the New
Italian Rules on Arbitration in Corporate Matters, 7 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 8 (2004).
43. See Vaccarella, supra note 41, at 262.
44. For some critical remarks, see Dondi, supra note 38, at 139. See also Angelo
Dondi, Impostazione ideologica e funzionalita nella riforma italiana recente del processo

civile, 35
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251 (2004).

HeinOnline -- 39 Cornell Int'l L.J. 69 2006

70

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 39

talize ancient conceptions about the mutual apportionment of powers
between professional participants such as judges and advocates, adopting
the approach of the nineteenth century, rather than facing the complex
reality of modern civil cases. This seems even worse because it is conceived to regulate commercial litigation. However, the philosophy of the
Italian new procedural rules for commercial cases is an exceptional and, to
the best of our knowledge, isolated event in the perspective of solving the
many problems connected to the management of controversies of this kind.
The above-mentioned similarities in terms of the complex questions of
fact and law that these disputes involve, short of the legal system in which
the single case is to be adjudicated, seem to move powerfully toward an
approximation or a convergence of procedural law. A basic feature of this
progression is an awareness that these cases, while requiring active and
creative initiatives by the advocates, are in absolute need of an even more
powerful engagement and pushing of initiatives by judges.
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